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ABSTRACT: Since 2004, there is a growing awareness of the risks that tsunamis pose to coastal communities globally. 
Despite the fact that these events were already an intrinsic part of the culture of some countries such as Chile and Japan, 
many other places had virtually not heard about such phenomenon before 2004. Nevertheless, the frequent reoccurrence 
of major tsunamis in recent years has led to the emergence of a “tsunami culture” in many areas of the world, which has 
resulted in increased awareness, disaster preparedness and willingness of local populations to evacuate when the threat 
of these events arises. However, evacuation during a tsunami is still not successfully carried out by the different 
elements of society, pointing to lack of awareness, an over-reliance in defence mechanisms or lacking in the 
transmitting of knowledge from previous events.  This paper will explore these cultural issues using as a basis 
questionnaires carried out by the authors during their own field visits to the last three major events (Chile in 2009, 
Indonesia in 2010 and Japan in 2011), and interpret these through the willingness of coastal communities to build 
protection measures along the shore and the impact that these can have on sustainable development. The existence of a 
“traditional tsunami culture” will be explored through an analysis of the existence of multi-layer safety system 
constructed by previous generations, and whether this is being preserved nowadays or past lessons are being forgotten. 
 
Keywords: Tsunami, counter-measures, culture, Banda Aceh, Tohoku, Chile 
 
 
                                                 
1Graduate School of Frontier Science, The University of Tokyo, 5-1-5 Kashiwanoha, Chiba, 277-8563, JAPAN  
2 Civil Engineering Department, The University of Delft,NETHERLANDS 
3
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Waseda University, 3-4-1 Ookubo, Tokyo 169-8555, JAPAN  
4
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Waseda University, 3-4-1 Ookubo, Tokyo 169-8555, JAPAN   
5International Research Institute of Disaster Science, Tohoku University, JAPAN 
6 Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Waseda University, 3-4-1 Ookubo, Tokyo 169-8555, JAPAN  
INTRODUCTION 
There is an increasing world-wide awareness of the 
risk associated with tsunamis due to high number of 
severe events documented by the world’s media within a 
reasonably short period (from 2004 in Indonesia to 2011 
in Japan). This has led many countries to develop 
tsunami warning systems and evacuations plans (such as 
the development of the Indian Ocean Tsunami alarm 
system following the 2004 tsunami). Although these 
might make little sense in the short-run (due to the low 
frequencies of these events in many parts of the world), 
in the long-run, if they are maintained, they could 
drastically reduce the mortality rates due to these events. 
However, for this to happen, it is imperative that a 
“tsunami culture” is created and kept, requiring 
important investments in education, infrastructure and 
drilling exercises.  
The present paper will discuss the emergence of a local 
and global “tsunami culture” through the last 3 major 
tsunamis (Indonesia in 2004, Chile in 2010, and Japan in 
2011). The attitude of the local residents when faced 
with a tsunami will be investigated, regarding when and 
why the residents chose to evacuate. Following each 
tsunami event typically there is a major drive to increase 
disaster preparedness through the construction of 
defence structures, relocation of communities away from 
danger zones and the improvement of evacuation 
systems. By interpreting all these elements from the 
point of view of a multi-layer safety risk management 
strategy, it is possible to gage to what extent each of 
these countries possessed a “tsunami culture” prior to 
each tsunami, and how this might influence future 
disaster preparedness.  
Multi-layer safety is a concept in flood risk management 
that introduces the integration of flood risk probability-
reducing measures and loss-mitigating measures in a 
flood protection system (see the National Water Plan of 
the Netherlands). Essentially the role of the former is to 
prevent inundation while the latter is meant to function 
only in case an extreme event exceeds the expectations 
of the prevention lines and inundation occurs. The multi-
layer safety system can be distinguished three safety 
layers as follows:  
 Layer 1 - Prevention: this is defined as preventing 
seawater from inundating areas that are usually dry by 
building flood defences such as dykes or breakwaters. 
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 Layer 2 - Spatial Solutions: This means using spatial 
planning and adaptation of buildings to decrease the loss 
if a flood does occur. 
 Layer 3 - Emergency Management: This layer 
focuses on the organizational preparation for floods such 
as disaster plans, risk maps, early-warning systems, 
evacuation and medical help. 
Whether multiple layers of safety are present in a 
system, and which ones are prioritized, can vary 
significantly in different countries and regions. This 
generally depends on two parameters, the frequency and 
effect of extreme events that can cause a water disaster 
over time, and the economic resources available for 
investments in infrastructure for flood protection 
(Tsimopoulou, 2012). Developing countries, whose 
resources for construction infrastructure are limited, 
often compromise by using only loss-mitigating 
measures, which can be much cheaper and smaller in 
scale than prevention structures. On the other hand, 
richer countries such as Japan have more financial 
resources for flood protection. 
In the present paper, the authors will analyse each of 
the three target countries in terms of whether any safety 
measures existed before their respective tsunamis in 
order to attempt to understand to what extent a tsunami 
culture was present, how this influenced the 
development of a multi-layer safety strategy, and if this 
was a deliberate risk management strategy or not.  
 
CHILE 
Chile has suffered from tsunami events regularly 
throughout its history. The last major one was in 1960, 
and therefore the threat that they pose was still present in 
the minds of the older generation. On February 27, 2010, 
a large earthquake of magnitude Mw 8.8 generated a 
tsunami that caused heavy damage to the coastal area 
(Mikami et al., 2010). Tsunami inundation height was 4-
10 m in a wide area of Chilean coast, with a maximum 
recorded run-up height of over 20 m (Mikami et al., 
2010). Structured interviews were carried out to collect 
information regarding the tsunami heights, evacuation 
and life after the disaster. 
Generally speaking, it could be said that tsunami 
counter-measures were not adequately developed in 
Chile. Prevention measures were virtually non-existent, 
showing how little effort was made to develop layer 1 
measures. Where present, they appeared not to have been 
there to prevent the damage due to any natural disasters, 
but more as an accidental feature of the terrain. For 
example, in the village of Llolleo sand dunes protected 
parts of the coastline (see Fig. 1).  
 
 
Fig. 1  Partially degraded sand dunes at Llolleo 
 
 
Fig. 2 Destroyed houses behind the sand dunes 
 
These sand dunes were effective in blocking the 
tsunami, at least on the side of the village where the sand 
dune was continuous. The southern half of the village, 
however, only had a broken sand dune to the west side of 
it, and was completely open to the sea on its southern 
half. This part of the village was consequently almost 
completely wiped out (see Fig. 2) 
The houses on stilts that survived were the only 
indication of some of the layer 2 measurements. This 
does point out to the existence of a “tsunami culture.” 
However, this culture clearly does not exist at 
institutional levels as such a settlement should not exist 
in a potentially hazardous area, especially considering no 
tsunami warning system or other counter-measures were 
in place. Layer 2 measures were thus absent throughout 
most of the country; and when they did appear to have 
been established through historical events rather than as 
part of a modern risk management strategy (famously, 
the present location of the regional capital of Concepcion 
was relocated after the previously capital on the seaside 
was destroyed several times by historical tsunamis). This 
would point out to the existence of not only a “tsunami 
culture”, but also to a “tsunami cultural legacy”.  
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Regarding level 3 measures, little existed in terms of 
evacuation buildings or other evacuation plans. A 
structured survey conducted on the local residents by the 
authors indicated that around 50% of the residents of 
coastal areas appeared not to have ever taken part in 
evacuation drills. A tsunami warning system did exist, 
though the authorities failed to act properly and a 
tsunami alert was not issued. Despite this failure, 
residents evacuated most coastal areas, and especially 
fishermen (and in some cases local policemen) instructed 
residents to leave due to the danger of an incoming 
tsunami, as can be seen from Fig. 3. It is important to 
understand that the residents of many coastal areas were 
fishermen, and amongst them, there was a widespread 
knowledge about tsunamis. Most residents actually 
decided to evacuate to surrounding hills immediately 
after the earthquake, though some did wait until after the 
first tsunami wave. Fortunately, in many cases, the first 
wave appeared not to have been as strong as the second 
wave. Ultimately, and despite the lack of warning made 
by the authorities, the evacuation was generally effective 
and casualties were low. The main exception was an 
island off the coast of Constitucion where dozens of 
people had been camping, all of whom perished. In this 
case, local fishermen normally ferried people to the 
island; and hence, those who were camping on the island 
were unable to escape. 
The limited number of casualties and the speed in 
which local residents evacuated to nearby mountains 
when prompted by fishermen or local authorities point 
out to the existence of a strong tsunami culture. This has 
been reinforced in the aftermath of the event, and the 
authors understand that various studies are being 
commissioned throughout Chile to improve disaster 
preparedness. Particularly, priority is being given to 
areas where there is a “seismic gap,” and it is expected 
that disaster preparedness will significantly increase in 
the future.    
                        
 
Fig. 3 Source of information that prompted local 
residents to evacuate 
INDONESIA (MENTAWAI ISLANDS) 
At 21:42 local time on October 25, 2010, a large 
earthquake of magnitude Mw 7.7 occurred off the coast 
of Mentawai Islands in Indonesia, generating a tsunami 
that struck the coastal area of these islands. Houses 
located near to the sea (generally wooden constructions) 
were washed away with damage gradually decreasing as 
the wave progressed inland. The areas generally 
possessed little in terms of modern infrastructure, and 
thus most of the recorded damage was to housing (See 
Fig. 4) 
In the case of the Mentawai Islands it is clear that an 
adequate tsunami multi-layer protection system was not 
in place. The only layer 1 feature that could be observed 
was the coastal forests in front of the villages, though 
these were not sufficiently wide to provide much 
protection. It is not clear why villages were situated 
somewhat inland from the water edge, which did give 
residents some extra time to escape after hearing the 
approaching tsunami. It is possible that prior events had 
constantly destroyed the houses located closer to the 
water; and thus, the fact that the main side of most 
villages was far from the edge was a sort of “tsunami 
cultural legacy,” even if local residents were unaware of 
it. This could constitute some sort of “layer 2,” though it 
was clearly not due to careful planning, and it could have 
been just coincidental.  
For the case of layer 3, it appeared that some 
measures had been taken. A tsunami warning system had 
been put in place, including a tsunami buoy, though it 
was not operational at the time of the event. Residents 
were reasonably well aware of the threat of the tsunamis; 
and evacuated the area when prompted, mainly after 
receiving information from the radio, aid organizations 
present in the area (according to 42% of respondents) or 
by their own initiative (another 42% said that they 
evacuated the area after feeling the earthquake).  
 
 
 
Fig. 4 All wooden houses were destroyed in Gobic 
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In terms of evacuation preparedness, residents in 
some areas visited by the authors explained how they 
had take part in tsunami drills, and that they were aware 
of what to do in the case of a tsunami. However, these 
tsunami drills were not conducted in all locations. 
Nevertheless in the areas surveyed the evacuation was 
often successful, as local residents had enough time to 
evacuate. 
This indicates the existence of a tsunami culture, 
though maybe not as developed as in the case of Chile, 
which appeared to be the consequence of education 
(tsunami drills) rather than the knowledge transmitted by 
previous generations. The reason why a stronger tsunami 
culture, based on previous events, was not captured by 
the surveys is unclear. It could be due to remoteness of 
the islands, which means that education did not reach the 
islands till recently, and thus information was not 
adequately transmitted from generation to generation. It 
is also possible that, despite the islands being located in 
an area of high tsunami risk, no tsunami occurred in the 
islands for a long period of time, and that the villages 
surveyed were “relatively new,” formed by descendants 
of people who lived on other parts of the islands that are 
not usually affected by tsunamis. Clearly, more research 
is needed to ascertain this, even though it was evident 
that a certain tsunami culture does exist now, and that it 
will be reinforced by this event. For instance, some 
villages have decided to relocate further inland, like the 
movement of people from the “old” Gobic to the “new” 
Gobic, further inland. 
 
JAPAN 
On March 11, 2011, an earthquake of magnitude 9.0 
on the Richter Scale took place off the northeast coast of 
Japan, generating a major tsunami which devastated 
large parts of the coastline and caused large numbers of 
casualties (Mori et al., 2012). Inundation heights were 
measured to be in the range of more than 10 m in the 
northern part of Miyagi, 5 to 10 m along the coast of 
Sendai Bay and around 5 m along the shores of Ibaraki 
and Chiba. On the Sendai plain, the maximum 
inundation height was 19.5m, and the tsunami 
propagated as a bore more around 4-5km inland (Mikami 
et al., 2012).  
Buildings, including many well-engineered 
reinforced concrete structures, were washed away or 
suffered extensive damage while numerous ships, as well 
as large boats were left stranded inland. Coastal 
protection works, such as dikes, tsunami walls, 
breakwaters and coastal forests, were overwhelmed and 
suffered heavy damage. The tsunami had been widely 
anticipated, as frequent tsunamis have hit the area in the 
past, with three major ones taking place since the 
beginning of the Meiji Era (1868~), which are known as 
the Meiji-Sanriku (1896), Showa-Sanriku (1933) and 
Chile (1960) tsunamis. In fact, the 2011 Great Eastern 
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami has been described as 
one in several thousand years event, resembling thus the 
Jogan Tsunami which occurred in A.D. 869; and  
constituting one of the worst events in the history of the 
country (Sawai, 2006) 
   This was actually the first time in history that a 
tsunami had encountered a well-developed modern 
tsunami counter-system method (Mori et al., 2012). 
Before the 2011 Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and 
Tsunami, a large variety of tsunami countermeasures, 
representative of all three layers of multi-layer safety, 
could be found along the coast of Tohoku. This clearly 
indicates that a tsunami culture existed in Japan prior to 
the event. However, the type of tsunami counter-
measures employed were not uniform along the entire 
affected coast. Generally speaking, layer 1 measures 
included offshore breakwaters and tsunami walls along 
the northern part of the coastline (known as the rias area) 
and coastal levees and sandy frontages on the southern 
region (known as the Sendai coastal plain). Most of these 
structures and the area behind them suffered extensive 
damage, as can be seen in Fig. 5.  
   The spatial arrangements that are part of layer 2 
measures are the placement of important social 
infrastructure buildings on higher grounds, and the flood 
proofing of high buildings by placing the most important 
functions on higher floors. A general remark about layer 
2 measures is that although they are distinct in Tohoku, 
they were not within the framework of a general strategy 
for mitigation of tsunami damage. There were schools 
and hospitals located on higher grounds that were 
unaffected or affected less than the majority of buildings, 
such as the hospital of Onagawa on a ground elevation of 
15m, where only the ground floor was inundated. On the 
other hand, there were important administration 
buildings that were destroyed, such as the Disaster 
Prevention Centre of Minamisanriku, located close to the 
waterfront.  
 
Fig. 5 Extensive failure of coastal dykes 
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   Due to the high frequency of tsunamis in Tohoku 
layer 3 measures (such as early-warning and evacuation 
schemes) were well developed with local residents and 
children frequently taking part in evacuation exercises. 
Only three minutes after the earthquake, a tsunami 
warning was issued. People knew how to and where to 
evacuate as a result of having been verbally warned by 
those around them, official evacuation orders, or 
warning messages.  
However, the time available for evacuation in some 
areas was too short, and many people perished while 
attempting to move to higher grounds, or for a variety of 
other factors (Yun and Hamada, 2012). It is also 
apparent that despite instruction not to use vehicles, in 
some areas residents tried to escape using their cars, and 
this might have created traffic jams. Nevertheless, 
Tohoku could be considered as one of the most prepared 
coastal areas in the world for a tsunami emergency, and 
tsunami preparedness was clearly taken seriously by 
local authorities and residents, highlighting the high 
level of tsunami culture present. Throughout the region, 
numerous tsunami memorials, tree lines and marks of the 
inundation level from previous events could be found, 
which kept the memory of previous events alive 
(Suppasri, 2012). Following this last event, other 
monuments, marks and symbols are also being created, 
which will surely help the transmission of a tsunami 
culture to later generations. What is particularly 
interesting is the placement of inundation signs along all 
major roads, showing the beginning and end of the 
inundated sections, which means that drivers will be 
constantly reminded of this past event in the future.  
 
DEVELOPMENT OF A GLOBAL “TSUNAMI 
CULTURE” 
After a tsunami event the damage to coastal areas 
generally leaves an important imprint in the minds of 
those who experienced it, often discouraging the 
construction of new buildings close to the coastline, at 
least in the short term. In the case of the Mentawai 
Islands, the residents of Gobic village started to take 
refuge and rebuild on higher grounds (“new Gobic”) in a 
different area. In the mid-term, of course, many of these 
inhabitants may return to more coastal areas, and arrivals 
from different regions or the descendants of those who 
experience the tsunami might “forget” the event. 
This highlights the importance of decisive 
institutional actions to establish effective layer 2 
measures, were the inhabitants of an area do not “forget” 
past events and the construction of housing in areas that 
are at high risk are prevented. One such example is given 
by Suzuki (2012) for the case of Toni-Hongo village in 
Japan. The village was completely destroyed by the 1896 
Meiji-Sanriku Tsunami, with 88% of its inhabitants 
perishing. This prompted the survivors to relocate to the 
hillside, though only 5 houses actually did so due to the 
inconvenience this caused to fishermen and their 
families. It could be said that relocation failed, and the 
village was once again destroyed by the tsunami of 1933, 
though this time only 53% of the inhabitants died. 
Although the mortality rate did go down, it was still high 
as not many individuals had survived the 1896 event. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the 1933 tsunami, residents 
decided to relocate to a terraced land on the hillside, and 
the construction of the houses was prohibited in the 
inundated area. Following the 1960 Chilean tsunami the 
construction of tsunami counter-measures was started, 
with the first 5m high wall finished in 1969, which was 
then elevated to 11.8m in 1980.  However, after the 1960 
Chile tsunami, some houses were gradually built on the 
lower areas of the village, and the 2011 tsunami 
destroyed 50 of them (though mortality in the village 
was only 0.7%, as many villagers still lived in the higher 
areas and there was a clear indication that the villagers 
should evacuate there in the case of a tsunami)  
It is important to note that it is possible that the 
population that will live in tsunami prone areas in the 
future will decrease in the Tohoku region, mainly due to 
the effect that the tsunami has had on the local 
population. Fig. 6 illustrates the relationship between the 
number of inhabitants who would like to move to safer 
areas as a proportion of the population that perished in 
various localities in the Rias coastline (Oyama, 2012). 
Fig. 7 shows also the relationship between those who 
would like to leave compared to the proportion of the 
population that lived in areas that were inundated, for 
each city. If this is compounded with an expected 
demographic decline due to population aging, then it is 
clear that far less people will probably live around these 
areas (Japanese National Institute of Population and 
Social Security Research, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 Relationship between number of inhabitants who 
would like to depart from each population centre and the 
proportion of casualties  
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Fig.7 Relationship between number of inhabitants who 
would like to depart and the proportion of the population 
in each of the inundated areas 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Recent tsunami events have increased tsunami 
awareness throughout the world, leading to the 
emergence of a “global tsunami culture.” Such tsunami 
cultures already existed in a number of countries, such as 
Japan or Chile, due to the numerous events that took 
place in the past, and which continue to be alive in 
people’s memory either through oral transmission or 
education. In other places, such as Mentawai, the 
cultural link to past events is less clear, though a tsunami 
culture is starting to be created through improvements in 
education and recent events. Nevertheless, it is 
imperative that the awareness about coastal disasters 
continues to increase in the future, so that multi-layer 
safety measures are promoted throughout all areas at risk 
of tsunamis and storm surges. This awareness needs to 
be coupled with efficient and well designed evacuation 
strategy that targets the worst case events (Level 2 
events, as defined in Shibayama et al., 2013) so that the 
entire population of each settlement can reach safe areas. 
The emergence of a “tsunami culture” is a great 
opportunity for states to proceed on 
formalizing/improving their flood risk management 
practice. In this respect multi-layer safety is one choice, 
but other strategies need to be considered too. 
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